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Making	a	21st	century	constitution:	the	rules	we	have
established	for	democracies	are	now	outdated
Democratic	constitutions	are	unfit	for	purpose,	with	governments	facing	increased	pressures	from	populists	and
distrust	from	citizens.	The	only	way	to	truly	solve	these	problems	is	through	reform,	argues	Frank	Vibert.	He	draws
on	his	new	book	on	the	topic	and	sets	out	the	ways	in	which	constitutions	should	be	revitalised.
Democracies	are	struggling	in	many	parts	of	the	world.	Explanations	of	why	this	is	happening	often	focus	on
economics.	The	2008	international	financial	crisis	shook	confidence	in	market	economies.	Job	markets	seem	much
less	secure.	In	my	new	book	‘Making	a	21st	Century	Constitution’	I	put	forward	a	different	explanation.	In	my	view,
constitutions	are	the	problem.	The	frameworks	of	bodies	and	rules	they	have	established	for	democracies	are	now
outdated	in	fundamental	ways.	They	do	not	provide	the	support	that	democracies	need	in	today’s	world.
There	is	a	basic	difference	between	these	two	types	of	explanation.	If	economics	is	the	cause,	then
democratic	discontents	should	disappear	as	economic	recovery	takes	hold.	If	it	is	constitutions	that
are	the	problem,	there	will	be	continuing	dysfunction.	The	discontents	will	not	disappear	until	the
framework	of	rules	under	which	democracies	operate	are	changed.	In	his	last	‘State	of	the	Union’
address,	former	President	Obama	stated	that	we	should	look	critically	at	flaws	in	the	system	rather
than	at	the	flawed	people	it	produces	for	political	office.	I	agree.
There	is	no	generally	accepted	approach	to	constitutional	analysis.	But,	since	the	time	of	the
American	Founding	Fathers,	assumptions	about	human	behaviour	and	its	imperfections	have	been
central.	The	work	of	behavioural	economists	and	social	psychologists	illuminates	individual	and
group	behaviour	in	three	areas	of	great	importance	for	the	way	in	which	we	think	about	constitutions	in	today’s	world.
Privacy	and	the	Private	realm
The	first	area	relates	to	privacy.	In	today’s	world	we	trade	and	exchange	our	privacy.	We	value	privacy.	At	the	same
time,	when	we	use	our	mobile	phones	and	the	internet	we	allow	our	identity	to	be	authenticated	and	our	behaviour	to
be	predicted.	We	do	so	because	of	the	sheer	convenience	we	derive	from	the	mobile	and	its	apps.
This	world	is	very	different	from	defining	the	private	in	terms	of	an	inviolable	physical	space,	such	as	an	18 th	century
homestead,	or	a	20th	century	home.	Yet	it	is	this	older	conception	of	the	private	that	underlies	the	idea	of	democratic
consent	to	a	constitution.	According	to	this	old	concept	we	stand	in	our	private	space	and	give	our	consent	to	rules
that	define	what	is	to	be	public	and	agree	on	the	powers	that	are	to	be	transferred	to	and	belong	in	the	public	realm.
There	are	two	ways	of	reacting	to	this	change.	The	first	is	to	downgrade	the	importance	of	consent.	The	second	is	to
place	a	new	weight	on	bodies	and	rules	that	aim	keep	the	basic	importance	of	consent	alive.	Generally	speaking,
since	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century,	both	constitutional	theory	and	practice	have	followed	the	first	of	these
routes.	The	idea	that	we	should	give	our	consent	has	become	less	important	than	the	idea	that	we	should	identify
with	the	content	of	constitutions.	We	are	invited	to	identify	with	their	content	by	statements	of	aspirations	and,	above
all,	by	lengthy	recitals	of	rights.	In	my	analysis	I	conclude	by	reaffirming	the	basic	importance	of	consent.
Social	Diversity
A	second	area	where	assumptions	about	human	behaviour	are	crucial	concerns	modern	day	social	diversity.
Traditionally,	deep	social	diversity	has	been	seen	in	terms	of	minorities	that	need	protection	against	a	prevailing
majority	and	where	the	minority	or	minorities	could	often	be	defined	in	territorial	terms.	However,	in	modern	societies
most	of	us	encounter	deep	social	diversity	in	shared	urban	settings,	shared	service	provision	and	in	shared	work
places.	The	social	fabric	of	London	is	the	prime	example.
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Some	people	welcome	social	diversity	and	choose	to	live	in	cities	such	as	London	because	of	the	stimulus	they
provide	and	for	the	innovation	they	can	encourage.	But	social	psychologists	also	warn	about	the	defensive	thinking
and	behaviour	that	individuals	and	groups	can	adopt	when	their	established	ways	of	viewing	the	world	are
challenged.	Many	of	the	crucial	differences	cut	across	ethnic	and	religious	divides	and	are,	for	example,	about
attitudes	towards	the	appropriate	social	roles	of	men	and	women,	or	about	attitudes	to	authority.
We	expect	constitutions	to	be	able	to	encourage	cooperative	behaviour	and	social	‘togetherness’.	The	contemporary
challenge	is	about	how	to	achieve	this	in	shared	settings	when	all	groups,	regardless	of	size,	may	react	defensively
to	defend	their	own	values.	In	this	context	my	book	discusses	how	constitutions	can	support	democratic	politics	in
playing	a	socially	adaptive	role	so	that	people	are	prepared	to	modify	their	values	in	order	to	find	an	acceptable
‘better	there’.	I	refer	to	this	as	a	‘transvaluational	‘role.
Rationality	in	politics
It	would	be	nice	to	believe	that	we	are	all	reasonable	people,	with	well-considered	preferences	and	priorities,	open	to
reasoned	arguments	and	ready	to	be	persuaded	to	change	our	views	when	presented	with	a	well-reasoned
argument.	But	social	psychologists	suggest	that	what	we	consider	‘reasonable’	depends	on	the	context.	Politics	is
about	shortcut	reasoning	reflecting	a	world	of	information	overload	where	we	do	not	want	to	spend	too	much	time	on
politics.	It	is	associative	reasoning.	We	pay	attention	to	the	views	of	those	with	whom	we	connect	in	our	social	world,
including	our	social	media	connections.	It	is	‘diagnostic’	reasoning.	We	assume	that	what	is	good	for	our	friends	and
associates	is	also	good	for	us.	We	pay	attention	to	the	messenger,	the	person	or	group	who	brings	me	a	viewpoint,
without	spending	time	on	going	into	the	detailed	content	or	implications	of	what	is	being	said.
The	drawbacks	are	that	we	pay	attention	mainly	to	the	views	of	those	we	agree	with	and	there	is	also	a	gulf
established	between	the	more	deductive	forms	of	reasoning	essential	in	public	policy	making.	An	important	task	of	a
modern	constitution	is	therefore	to	help	make	people	more	attentive	to	wider	sources	of	information	and	views	–	the
information	from	the	social	and	natural	sciences	and	the	views	of	those	with	whom	we	do	not	agree.
Institutional	economics
There	are	other	features	of	the	contemporary	setting	where	the	analysis	in	my	book	draws	on	institutional	economics
for	insights.	Two	important	areas	concern	the	role	of	intermediaries	and	the	role	of	benchmarking.
Benchmarking	and	the	role	of	rights
In	our	world	of	information	overload,	we	increasingly	resort	to	benchmarks	to	guide	our	decision	taking.	We	may
choose	schools	for	our	kids	based	on	the	grading	of	inspectors,	or	a	university	based	on	nationally-	or	internationally-
produced	ratings,	or	choose	a	book	on	the	basis	of	the	awarding	of	prizes,	or	download	music	based	on	standings	in
charts	we	follow.
In	the	book	I	analyse	this	increased	reliance	on	benchmarking	by	looking	at	a	sector	where	they	have	become
increasingly	pervasive	–	the	financial	sector.	Benchmarking	in	constitutional	terms	takes	the	form	of	an	ever-
increasing	reliance	on	declarations	of	rights.	They	direct	our	attention	to	what	is	most	relevant	in	complex	ethical
choices.	Unfortunately,	as	with	other	forms	of	benchmarking,	they	are	subject	to	over-production,	to	the	narrowing	of
claims,	to	manipulation,	and	to	moral	hazard.	My	book	warns	against	the	over-extension	of	the	role	of	rights	beyond
mainly	procedural	rights.	Over-reliance	disguises	the	more	difficult	task	of	getting	institutions	correctly	specified.
Directness	and	the	role	of	intermediaries
In	today’s	world	we	expect	markets	to	be	responsive	to	our	demands	in	very	immediate	ways.	We	are	all	familiar	with
the	disruption	to	old	forms	of	delivery	in	high	street	retailing,	banking	and	other	fields	as	we	all	order	online.
Institutional	economics	suggests	that	we	need	to	look	behind	this	directness	of	the	marketplace	in	order	to	identify
the	intermediaries	involved	–	the	web	service	providers,	the	data	collectors,	distributers	and	processors,	the
payments	and	delivery	systems.
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Much	the	same	reliance	on	new	intermediaries	is	occurring	in	non-	market	sectors	such	as	in	the	provision	of
government	services	where	specialist	bodies	are	proliferating.	However,	we	do	not	experience	the	growth	of	longer
and	more	dispersed	chains	of	specialist	bodies	in	government	in	the	form	of	a	higher	degree	of	democratic
immediacy	and	responsiveness.	On	the	contrary,	each	of	the	key	attributes	of	democratic	government	–	the	broad
inclusiveness	it	offers,	the	scope	it	gives	for	voter	feedback	to	those	with	authority,	and	voter	input	into	the	formation
of	policy	priorities,	seem	weakened	rather	than	strengthened.	Elites	and	those	who	know	how	to	deal	with	the
intermediaries	seem	to	have	gained	advantage.
One	way	of	responding	to	this	situation	is	to	look	at	constitutions	as	chains	of	intermediation	themselves.	They
provide	for	interventions	at	the	beginning	of	the	chain,	where	they	can	re-establish	directness	of	communication,	in
the	middle	where	they	can	provide	for	new	types	of	representation,	such	as	a	body	that	scrutinises	inter-generational
fairness,	and	at	the	end	of	the	chain	where	they	can	provide	for	oversight	without	being	dependent,	in	the	way
constitutional	courts	are,	on	the	referral	of	individual	cases.
Conclusions
Constitutional	analysis	seems	a	long	way	from	the	real	world	and	a	long	way	too	from	the	noise	of	day-to-day
politics.	Yet	we	should	care	about	constitutional	design.	Constitutional	failure	brings	a	human	cost.	Design	has	been
following	past	models	from	past	times.	We	are	now	in	a	different	world.	We	need	to	rethink.
_______
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	new	book	‘Making	a	21st	Century	Constitution:	Playing	Fair	in	Modern
Democracies‘,	published	by	Elgar	in	June	2018.
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